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INTRODUCTION
The nature of the modern patent system has allowed for abusive
litigation tactics. In particular, because the cost of early settlement
is often much lower than defending a patent suit on its merits,
“nuisance-value patent suits” have become popular.1 Often such
suits are filed by “non-practicing entities” (NPEs) or “patent asser-
tion entities” (PAEs), which, because of their abusive litigation
strategies, are commonly known as “patent trolls.”2 And while nu-
merous causes are attributed to encouraging such practices, in-
cluding the high costs of patent litigation, the large number of
patents issued, and the uncertainty surrounding a patent’s claims,3
the traditionally low pleading standards have often been key in
facilitating patent trolls’ abusive litigation tactics.4 
1. Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Propos-
al, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 159 (2008); see Jonathan L. Moore,
Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a Post-Twombly World, 18
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 484-89 (2010). 
2. See, e.g., Rebecca Schoff Curtin, SLAPPing Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legisla-
tion Can Learn from the Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 40-41 (2014);
Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out ‘Patent Trolls,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-suits.
html [https://perma.cc/2WDT-X25E].
3. See generally Moore, supra note 1, at 467-69 (“[S]ignificant ... uncertainty surrounding
patent litigation also encourages early settlement.”). For example, a common defense in
patent infringement cases is for the alleged infringer to show that the asserted patent is
invalid and thus unenforceable. See id. at 467. However, patents are presumed to be valid, so
the challenging party must establish a patent’s invalidity with “clear and convincing”
evidence, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986)), which,
to be successful, will ordinarily impose significant costs on the challenger. See Moore, supra
note 1, at 467. Other issues, such as prevailing defendants’ abilities to recover fees and
district courts’ disfavor of imposing Rule 11 sanctions, have encouraged abuse. See Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 287 & n.50, 293 (2015) (noting that the majority of courts do
not conduct Rule 11 inquiries); see also Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some)
Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 437 (2014). These additional issues, however, are beyond
the scope of this Note.
4. See Moore, supra note 1, at 476-86 (describing the simple pleading requirements in
patent cases under Form 18).
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Patent litigation and the problem of patent trolls has been a hot
topic for the past several years.5 Many nationwide reforms have
been discussed,6 but few have been implemented. Perhaps in re-
sponse to the lack of nationwide solutions, many district courts have
adopted local procedural rules for patent cases.7 Most, if not all, of
these reforms have been, at least in part, aimed at raising the
pleading standards for patent infringement cases. Such reform is a
worthy cause. Stricter pleading standards, especially in patent
cases, would likely be a worthwhile solution to the patent troll
problem. However, regardless of whether stricter standards are
implemented directly through legislation or amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or indirectly through local pro-
cedural rules that control the early stages of a case, the standards
cannot become so strict as to preclude worthy claimants. If the
standards are raised too high, there is a real risk that infringement
that occurs in secret—for example, a manufacturing process or
proprietary software that the patent holder cannot access—will
escape court enforcement because the patent holder will never get
the benefit of discovery.
This Note advocates for a specific approach—or rather implemen-
tation of a rule8—for dealing with the beginning of patent infringe-
ment cases. The Proposed Rule calls for a “heightened” pleading
5. See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO television broadcast Apr.
19, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA&feature=youtu.be [https://
perma.cc/T2HJ-CLUW] (discussing, among other things, a patent troll that sued an individual
for patent infringement on the basis that its patent covered “a computer program checking
a central server for authorization”: the “technology upon which all android apps are based”);
id. (“[R]esearch show[s] that [patent troll] litigation has cost investors an estimated [$500
billion] since 1990.”); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 280.
6. See generally Steven M. Zager et al., An Overview, a Summary, and an Update to the
Latest Patent Reform, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2015, at 3, 3; Thomas H. Kramer,
Note, Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertion Problem:
The Risks for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 467, 469 (2014)
(describing the “patent troll” litigation that has become a significant concern “over the last few
years”).
7. See generally, e.g., Jennifer H. Burdman & William J. Sauers, The State of Patent Law:
The Interplay of Recent, Pending, and Proposed Changes, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Oct.
2015, at 1, 9 (discussing the various proposed and implemented measures to curb patent liti-
gation abuse).
8. This Rule will be referred to as the “Proposed Rule.” That being said, this Rule may
actually need to take the form of more than one rule if it were formally adopted.
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standard paired with specific rules for infringement contentions.9 Its
goal is to address one aspect of direct patent infringement cases that
has enabled patent trolls to bring vague and meritless suits,10
without going so far as to prevent certain meritorious plaintiffs from
enforcing their patent rights.11 The Proposed Rule is envisioned as
being most useful as part of what several scholars have already
advocated for: a set of Federal Rules of Patent Procedure.12 A uni-
form set of rules would serve to reinstate uniformity across all dis-
tricts—an important principle of U.S. patent law and procedure in
federal courts, and something that has been eroded by the various
local procedural rules that substantively affect patent cases.13
Ultimately, the Proposed Rule, as part of a comprehensive set of
federal rules, would preserve uniformity by superseding the various
local patent rules that require early disclosures of patent infringe-
ment contentions.14
9. Although this Note focuses on claims for direct patent infringement, the principles
that inform this discussion could be applied to other issues in patent cases, such as indirect
infringement, which requires a showing of direct infringement. See, e.g., Limelight Networks,
Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 & n.3 (2014) (“[O]ur case law leaves no
doubt that inducement liability may arise ‘if, but only if, [there is] ... direct infringement.’”
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961))); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
10. See Moore, supra note 1, at 484-89 (describing how notice pleading enables abusive
patent litigation tactics).
11. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288-91 (claiming that Congress’s proposed
solution would cause unnecessary additional litigation).
12. See Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 67
(2015); see also, e.g., Megan Woodhouse, Note, Shop til You Drop: Implementing Federal
Rules of Patent Litigation Procedure to Wear Out Forum Shopping Patent Plaintiffs, 99 GEO.
L.J. 227, 230 (2010). Others disagree and have argued that district courts should be
laboratories of experimentation. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent
Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 307, 308 (2011); Lisa Larrimore Oullette, Patent
Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 69 (2015).
13. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 82 (claiming the local rules raise “different and possibly
more serious concerns about their impact not only on federal procedure, but on patent policy
too”); see id. at 84 (“The Federal Circuit was created to bring national uniformity to patent law
and to reduce forum shopping in patent litigation.”); see also Arthur Gollwitzer III, Local
Patent Rules—Certainty and Efficiency or a Crazy Quilt of Substantive Law?, ENGAGE, Mar.
2012, at 94, 94 (arguing that the various local rules substantively affect patent cases and go
against the uniformity principles of the Rules Enabling Act and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
14. It must be noted that the adoption of federal rules for patent procedure is not the only
method of achieving uniformity. Indeed, several bills have been discussed in Congress. See
infra Part II.A. And the recent abrogation of Rule 84 and Form 18 will likely result in more
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Part I of this Note gives a big-picture view of patent infringement
litigation and discusses issues related to the pleading requirements
in modern patent infringement litigation. Part II explores some of
the proposed and enacted solutions—including congressional bills,
local patent rules, and the abrogation of the Federal Appendix of
Forms and Rule 84. Part III explains and advocates for a solution to
the pleading requirements and infringement contentions in patent
cases by using, among other things, the tort doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur as a guide to interpreting infringement pleadings. Lastly,
this Note discusses how the Proposed Rule strikes a balance that
would serve both defendants—by helping protect them from
meritless claims—and plaintiffs, by keeping the courts open to mer-
itorious claims.
I. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
The following discussion proceeds in three parts. First, it gives a
brief background on patent infringement litigation. Second, it dis-
cusses how the pleading requirements for complaints in civil cases
have been altered by recent Supreme Court decisions. And lastly, it
discusses how the traditionally low pleading requirements in patent
infringement cases have invited abuse in that field.
A. Background on Patents and Infringement Litigation
The goal of the patent system is to promote science and the use-
ful arts for society’s benefit.15 The inventor of a novel, useful, and
uniformity. See infra Part II.C. However, because the abrogation of Rule 84 and Form 18 was
quite recent and the proposed congressional statutes have not been enacted, the various local
patent rules adopted by several district courts have had the largest impact. See infra Part
II.B. The local rules vary widely across these districts, and many districts have not adopted
any official rules for patent cases. See infra Part II.B. Lastly, some districts might be inclined
to use their local rules as reasons to deny a motion to dismiss, despite the fact that Form 18
no longer controls. See infra Part II.C.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S.
124, 142 (2001) (“The [public] disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the
right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))).
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nonobvious invention, which is both definite and directed towards
patentable subject matter, can apply to the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office for a utility patent.16 A patent application, and any
resulting patent, must describe the invention with enough detail
that a person of ordinary skill in the art could make and use the
invention.17 And though by its nature a patent discloses the inven-
tion to the public, the inventor or patentee18 is given an exclusive
twenty-year monopoly on the invention.19
The monopoly granted by a patent is a right to exclude.20 A
patentee is given “the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling” devices, apparatuses, processes, and/or
methods covered by their patent.21 And the primary means of en-
forcing these rights is through litigation: a patentee files a com-
plaint alleging patent infringement.22
The courts look to the claims of a patent when determining
whether a certain product infringes.23 At the end of every patent is
at least one claim (although often there are several), and each claim
has a set of “limitations” or “elements.”24 The claims dictate the
scope of, or describe what is covered by, the patent.25 And while
there are different ways a patent can be infringed—for example,
directly versus indirectly, or literally versus under the doctrine of
equivalents26—this Note focuses on complaints and pleadings of
16. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2012).
17. Id. § 112(a).
18. This Note uses the terms “inventor,” “patentee,” and “owner” interchangeably to refer
to the individual or entity that owns, or has been assigned the rights to, a patent.
19. Id. § 154(a). This twenty-year period begins running from the date of application, see
id. § 154(a)(2), unless the issue date is more than three years after actual filing date, in which
case the term of the patent is extended one day for each day after the end of that three-year
period, see id. § 154(b)(1)(B).
20. Id. § 154(a)(1).
21. Id.; see also id. § 271(a).
22. See Moore, supra note 1, at 457.
23. See Kyle R. Williams, Note, Plausible Pleading in Patent Suits: Predicting the Effects
of the Abrogation of Form 18, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 320-21 (2016).
24. See id. This Note uses the terms “limitations” and “elements” interchangeably.
25. See id. at 321 (“For device patents, the elements are typically the device’s individual
components, and for process patents, the elements are the particular steps in the patented
process.”).
26. See id. at 320.
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direct infringement for simplicity.27 Direct infringement occurs
when a single individual or entity, without the patentee’s permis-
sion, “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent.”28 To succeed on
a direct infringement claim, the patentee must show that the ac-
cused infringer (or accused instrumentality29) practiced, or read on,
every element of at least one valid patent claim.30
B. Background on Pleading Requirements
From the 1930s until sometime between 2007 and 2009, the
pleadings in nearly every civil action under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were governed by a “notice pleading” standard.31
This standard was liberal and in accordance with the principle of
giving broad access to justice for plaintiffs in federal court.32 Under
notice pleading, courts were prohibited—at least so far as the
Supreme Court had been concerned—from dismissing a claim unless
it was clear that there was “no set of facts” that the plaintiff could
prove to establish the claim.33
27. The principles discussed in this Note can apply to both direct and indirect infringe-
ment because there must be direct infringement for an indirect infringement claim to exist.
See, e.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 & n.3 (2014)
(“[O]ur case law leaves no doubt that ... liability [for indirect infringement] may arise ‘if, but
only if, [there is] direct infringement.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961))). And although the doctrine of
equivalents is virtually never successfully used, the concepts discussed herein can be applied
to this method of infringement because it is simply another way an accused instrumentality
can directly infringe a patent: instead of literally reading on each element, the accused
instrumentality practices each element’s equivalent. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732-33 (2002).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
29. This Note uses the terms “accused instrumentality,” “accused product,” and “accused
device” (and their plurals) interchangeably.
30. Williams, supra note 23, at 320-21.
31. See id. at 321-22, 328-29.
32. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2
(2009).
33. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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The Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, clarified that com-
plaints must state a plausible claim for relief,34 overruling the notice
pleading standard and “no set of facts” test from Conley v. Gibson,
a 1957 decision.35 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court ex-
plained that Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to be “plausible on its
face.”36 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed Twombly, ex-
plaining that it applies to all civil actions.37 Moreover, the Court
held that a complaint is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”38
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is “a
context-specific task.”39 First, a court considering a motion to dis-
miss begins by identifying pleadings that are legal conclusions: le-
gal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”40
Second, the court considers whether the remaining factual allega-
tions “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”41
After these two cases, it was unclear whether the notice pleading
standard still existed.42 Many scholars and practitioners felt that it
34. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
35. Spencer, supra note 32, at 5; see also Adam Steinmetz, Note, Pleading Patent Infringe-
ment: Applying the Standard Established by Twombly and Iqbal to the Patent Context, 13
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 482, 483, 485 (2012) (“The Supreme Court officially retired
Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language, holding instead that pleading requires ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63, 570)).
36. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also id. at 555-56 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). In
Twombly, the Court found that a complaint alleging violations of antitrust laws was lacking
and thus subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim because the complaint lacked facts
suggesting an agreement between various telecommunication companies to restrain trade or
commerce. See id. at 548-49, 555-57, 564-70. Such an agreement was necessary for liability;
independent, parallel action was insufficient under the relevant statute. See id.
37. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. In Iqbal, the Court found deficient a complaint alleging that
Iqbal was unconstitutionally detained in overly restrictive conditions due to his race, religion,
or national origin because the complaint lacked facts suggesting that the defendants did so
purposefully. See id. at 682-84. It was just as plausible that, in the aftermath of the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks, the defendants’ actions were constitutional and motivated by their
desire to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects
could be cleared of terrorist activity. See id.
38. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
39. Id. at 679.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 32, at 6 (“[T]he Twombly Court affirmed that ‘a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
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did not, suggesting that these decisions created a “heightened plead-
ing” standard.43 After Twombly, some lower courts flatly indicated
that heightened pleading requirements were now required, while
others continued to employ the old “no set of facts” test to scrutinize
complaints.44 After Iqbal, however, it was clear that the “plausibil-
ity” standard applied in all civil cases, and Form 18, along with the
several others, were likely in conflict because these forms were
developed under the notice pleading regime.45
C. The Problems Created by Traditional Pleading Requirements
in Patent Infringement Litigation
The traditional pleading requirements for patent infringement
enabled substantial abusive litigation by patent trolls. First, the
traditionally low pleading requirements for infringement cases,
which provided the standard for complaints of direct patent
infringement until Form 18 and Rule 84 were abrogated on De-
cember 1, 2015, were inconsistent with the plausibility standard of
Twombly and Iqbal. Second, these low standards invited abusive
litigation tactics, namely, “nuisance-value patent suits.”46
allegations,’ but then wrote that ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level’ and ‘a complaint must allege facts suggestive of illegal conduct.’”
(second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 564
n.8)). Spencer further explains that although requiring facts in the pleadings “seems akin to
particularized fact pleading of the kind previously thought not compelled by Rule 8, the Court
[noted] that ‘we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
43. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832-33 (2010); Jeremiah J. McCarthy & Matthew D. Yusick,
Twombly and Iqbal: Has the Court “Messed up the Federal Rules?,” 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 121,
126-130 (2011); Justin Olson, Note, If It (Ain’t) Broke, Don’t Fix It: Twombly, Iqbal, Rule 84,
and the Forms, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1375, 1381 (2016) (noting that Iqbal’s two-part test
rested on language “noticeably absent” from Rule 8 and “creat[ed] greater unpredictability for
litigants contrary to the ‘simplicity and brevity’ envisioned under Rule 84” (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 84)); see also, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288-91 (“Applying the Twombly/Iqbal
standard will modestly increase the amount of detail required in a complaint for direct patent
infringement.”).
44. See Spencer, supra note 32, at 7-8.
45. See Steinmetz, supra note 35, at 488; see also Spencer, supra note 32, at 12.
46. See Sudarshan, supra note 1, at 159.
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Since the Supreme Court’s holdings in Twombly and Iqbal im
posed a heightened pleading requirement in civil cases,47 the plead-
ing requirements for patent infringement cases have faced much
scrutiny.48 Prior to December 1, 2015—when Form 18 and Rule 84
were abrogated49—complaints alleging direct patent infringement
were subject only to the bare-bones requirements of Form 18. Form
18 was a model complaint for direct patent infringement that was
included in the Federal Appendix of Forms.50 In general terms,
Form 18 required:
(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
owns the patent[(s) at issue]; (3) a statement that [the] defen-
dant has been infringing the patent[(s)] “by making, selling, and
using [the device] embodying the patent”; (4) a statement that
the plaintiff has given the defendant notice of its infringement;
and (5) a demand for an injunction and damages.51
Moreover, thanks to Rule 84’s safe-harbor provision—“[t]he forms
in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the sim-
plicity and brevity that these rules contemplate”52—a complaint for
direct patent infringement would survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
47. See supra Part I.B.
48. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 1, at 497 (explaining that the “minimal requirements” of
Form 18 conflict with Twombly and Iqbal, which require pleadings to be “plausible”); see also,
e.g., J High, Patent Suit Pleading Standards Must Be Conformed to Supreme Court Prece-
dents, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., D.C.), Oct. 5, 2012, at 1, 1 (discussing how,
in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, it was unclear whether the heightened pleading require-
ment applied to claims for patent infringement). But see Andrew C. Michaels, An Infamous
Illustration of Patent Infringement Pleading: Form 18 and Context-Specificity, 19 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 286, 289 (2013) (arguing that Form 18 is consistent with the “context specific”
inquiry required under Twombly and Iqbal because, although it illustrates an infringement
complaint for a very simple patent, it could be read to require more information for more
complicated patents).
49. See Williams, supra note 23, at 318-19, 321-22, 331-34, 338-39; see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 84 (repealed 2015); FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 18 (repealed 2015).
50. Form 18 and Rule 84 were abrogated in a 2015 amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, effective December 1, 2015. See Williams, supra note 23, at 318-19, 321-22,
331-34, 338-39; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (repealed 2015); FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 18
(repealed 2015).
51. R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC (In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing
Sys. Patent Litig.), 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
app. Form 18 (repealed 2015).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (repealed 2015).
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dismiss so long as it contained these five simple allegations.53
Notably absent from Form 18 was any substantial requirement for
facts that demonstrate how the identified product(s) plausibly
infringe the asserted patent.54
Indeed, prior to its abrogation, the Federal Circuit acknowledged
the potential conflict between Form 18 and Twombly and Iqbal.55 In
reversing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for direct patent
infringement, the Federal Circuit explained that “to the extent the
parties argue that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the Forms
and create differing pleadings requirements, the Forms control.”56
Prior to the abrogation of Rule 84 and Form 18, a plaintiff could
avoid dismissal without alleging any substantive facts.57 Even if the
complaint lacked facts establishing how the accused product prac-
tices each element of the asserted patent claim or claims—the very
facts required to prevail at trial in an infringement case—a plaintiff
would survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.58
These minimal pleading standards allowed plaintiffs to get into
court with little to no pre-suit investigation costs, and they could
thus virtually always subject a defendant to burdensome dis-
covery.59 Accordingly, “nuisance-value” patent suits became a viable
business plan.60
The low pleading requirements under Form 18 and the high costs
of defense mean that plaintiffs in patent cases have historically
53. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that a complaint for direct patent infringe-
ment that tracks the language of the Form cannot be successfully attacked on a motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., In re Bill of Lading Transmission, 681 F.3d at 1334 (“The language of Rule
84 and the Advisory Committee Notes ‘make clear that a pleading, motion, or other paper that
follows one of the Official Forms cannot be successfully attacked.’” (quoting 12 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3162 (2d ed. 1997))); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6).
54. Yoonhee Kim, Note, Reconciling Twombly and Patent Pleadings Beyond the Text of
Form 18, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 511, 519 (2014) (“Form 18 provides no specifics of how
that device is infringing which claim of the patent.”).
55. See In re Bill of Lading Transmission, 681 F.3d at 1334.
56. Id. at 1334 (citing McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
57. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 284.
58. See id.
59. See Moore, supra note 1, at 484-86.
60. See Sudarshan, supra note 1, at 160 (“[A] litigation cost imbalance [in patent suits]
... favors plaintiffs over defendants.”).
2017] PATENT INFRINGEMENT 313
been in a position of power.61 For one, discovery costs are parti-
cularly high in patent cases.62 In a recent study on the costs of
discovery in patent cases, “costs through the end of discovery were
consistently reported as between 50% and 60% of total litigation
costs.”63 In contrast, a separate study on the costs of civil litigation
found that, in the median civil case, the discovery costs amounted
to 20% (for plaintiffs) and 27% (for defendants) of the total litiga-
tion costs.64 Although the disparity in discovery costs is not preva-
lent when patent cases are compared solely with civil cases of
similarly high-stakes awards, these extreme costs cannot be ig-
nored.65 Ultimately, because of the substantial awards at stake66
and the heavy costs of the expansive discovery in such cases, patent
litigation is catastrophically expensive.67 
On the other hand, plaintiffs in patent cases have the potential
for large monetary judgments; therefore, they can employ counsel
on a contingency fee basis.68 Moreover, because defendants in patent
cases “tend to possess ‘the bulk of the relevant evidence,’ they have
higher discovery costs than the patent holder.”69 Indeed, patent
trolls “normally are small operations focused just on licensing and
litigation that have few relevant witnesses, documents, or other
evidence,”70 and patent trolls “traditionally sue a large number of
defendants with very vague infringement contentions in their
61. See Moore, supra note 1, at 488-89 (noting that defendants are “forced to decide be-
tween settl[ing] and incurring” significant discovery expenses).
62. See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 179, 198 (2015).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 199 (“Discovery in patent litigation is on par with discovery in other civil
litigation of similar stakes.... Patent litigation is just one example of this ‘small subset’ of
‘complex, contentious, high stakes cases’ where discovery is widely seen as problematic.”).
66. See Moore, supra note 1, at 465.
67. See id. at 459 (“According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the
legal costs of a patent infringement action range from $600,000 to $5 million, depending on
the patentee’s potential recovery.”); Sudarshan, supra note 1, at 173 (“In cases with more than
$25 million at risk, the litigation costs were almost $4 million in 2003.”).
68. See Moore, supra note 1, at 466; see also Sudarshan, supra note 1, at 165-66.
69. Reilly, supra note 62, at 196 (quoting In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2009)).
70. Id.
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complaint.”71 These aspects, paired with traditionally low pleading
requirements, substantially lowered the costs of bringing suit,72
causing a severe imbalance in the costs associated with patent liti-
gation between plaintiffs and defendants.73 As a result, many defen-
dants have found it more economically responsible to “opt for the
‘nuisance’ settlement, even in the face of meritorious defenses.”74 
II. CONGRESSIONAL BILLS, LOCAL PATENT RULES, AND THE
 ABROGATION OF RULE 84 AND FORM 18
As a result of the cost imbalance inherent in the patent cases
discussed above, many solutions have been proposed and some have
been implemented to curb patent troll lawsuits. Most of the pro-
posed and implemented changes call for, among other things,75
reforming and increasing the pleading requirements for patent
infringement cases.76 The idea is that increasing the pleading stan-
dards would help curb nuisance lawsuits by requiring would-be
plaintiffs to expend additional resources to conduct more thorough
pre-suit investigations or face dismissal for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.77 The various proposed and
implemented solutions include: congressional bills that would
71. Ryan Hauer, Another Attempt at Patent Reform: S.1013 The Patent Abuse Reduction
Act of 2013, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 388-89 (2014).
72. See Moore, supra note 1, at 464-69, 484-86; see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 152 (2007).
73. See Moore, supra note 1, at 466-67, 484-89 (describing how the simple pleading
requirements lower costs for plaintiffs significantly); see also Hauer, supra note 71, at 388
(“While the initial costs of filing a suit are low for plaintiffs, the suit’s starting costs are in-
versely high for defendants.”).
74. Sudarshan, supra note 1, at 160.
75. Most, if not all, of the proposed (and implemented) changes address other areas for
reform beyond the pleading requirements, including those briefly discussed above. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 283-87 (discussing po-
tential reforms in the areas of discovery, fee-shifting, and suits against end users). However,
a further detailed discussion of these additional and supplementary options for reform is
beyond the scope of this Note.
76. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 283-85.
77. See Hauer, supra note 71, at 387-89; Moore, supra note 1, at 494-95.
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amend the federal patent law, local procedural rules for patent
cases, and the abrogation of the Appendix of Forms and Rule 84.78
In the past few years, there have been several proposed congres-
sional bills aimed at the patent troll problem.79 Most of these
proposed statutes call for heightened pleading requirements.80
However, the heightened pleading requirements in these bills might
go too far in the other direction by making it too difficult for mer-
itorious plaintiffs to get into court.81
On the other hand, most of the changes that have actually been
enacted have been at the local level in the form of various local
procedural rules for patent cases.82 Although the various local rules
that have been adopted generally do not directly alter the pleading
standards, they all provide for early disclosure of infringement con-
tentions, which some consider to “function as de facto heightened
pleading standards.”83 As a result, these local procedural rules can
substantively affect the result of patent cases.84 And because not all
78. See infra Parts II.A-C. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288-91 (describing
potential reforms to pleading requirements).
79. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 283-87; Zager et al., supra note 6, at 3.
80. See, e.g., Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation
Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).
81. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 291-92 (claiming the proposed bills “may invite
additional and unnecessary litigation at the pleading stage”); see also Curtin, supra note 2,
at 66-73, 77 (noting that raising pleading standards for all plaintiffs might make it difficult
to enforce certain kinds of patents); Brian Fung, Who’s Behind the Last-Minute Push to
Thwart Patent Reform?, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2014/05/21/whos-behind-the-last-minute-push-to-thwart-patent-reform/?utm_
term=.d5247f6a4ae0 [https://perma.cc/BYG2-LFYE] (“Many of the provisions [in the proposed
legislation] would have the effect of treating every patent holder as a patent troll.”); cf. Jeffrey
I.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit Infringement Investigations of Pro-
cess and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC ’Y 5, 13, 18-19 (2002) (discussing
the public policies behind the different notice requirements contained within sections of
the Process Patents Act).
82. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 76-78. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 289-92
(discussing the various local patent rules in place throughout the United States).
83. La Belle, supra note 12, at 105 (noting that although New Hampshire is alone in
explicitly modifying its pleading standard for patent cases, every district with local rules
requires early disclosure of infringement contentions); see also Tyco Fire Prods. LP v.
Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (explaining that using local patent
rules to alter pleading requirements “offends the trans-substantive character of federal
procedure” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). See generally High, supra note 48 (suggesting that
patent suit pleading standards should conform to Supreme Court precedents on pleading).
84. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 95-97 (discussing how the various local rules can
result in “case-dispositive differences”); see also Joseph E. Cwik, Local Patent Rules and Their
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districts have adopted local rules, and because the rules are not
uniform across the districts that have,85 the uniformity principles
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and U.S. Patent
Law are underserved.
Most recently, Rule 84 and the Federal Appendix of Forms were
abrogated, effective December 1, 2015.86 This change should lead to
more uniformity across the districts and might render the proposed
bills unnecessary. However, the removal of the Form 18 standard
will not have the same preemptive effect as putting into place a
specific infringement standard. For example, the district courts with
local patent rules that require early disclosure of infringement
contentions are likely to treat pleadings more leniently than those
without such local procedural rules, even though the pleading re-
quirements now require more detail.
A. Proposed Congressional Changes for Pleading Requirements in
Patent Cases
Recently, there have been several proposed solutions in the two
houses of Congress. Most of these proposals called for, among other
things, “heightened” pleading requirements and the elimination of
Form 18.87 Because this Note focuses on the pleading requirements
for direct patent infringement, the following discussion will be
limited to the proposed statutes that provide for heightened plead-
ing requirements and the impact thereof.88 Moreover, because all of
the proposed bills that call for heightened pleading requirements
provide for standards that are substantially the same as those
Impact on Patent Litigation, ASPATORE, 2012 WL 1670113, at *3 (2012).
85. See Moore, supra note 1, at 505.
86. Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to
John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of Representatives, attachment at 1, 28 (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://perma.cc/2BKN-6F84; see Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288 (explaining that these rule
changes align pleading requirements in patent cases with federal procedure); Williams, supra
note 23, at 318.
87. See, e.g., Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2(a), (c) (2013);
Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. §§ 3(a), 6(c) (2013). These bills were proposed before
Form 18 and the Federal Appendix of Forms were abrogated.
88. The proposed bills are intended to address the several perceived downfalls of the
current patent system. For a summary of some of the proposals, see Zager et al., supra note
6, at 4-5. For a critique of certain proposals, see Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288-97.
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provided in the House’s proposed Innovation Act,89 this discussion
will use the Innovation Act as an illustration and will note any
substantial differences in the other bills as necessary.
1. The Innovation Act as an Example
House Bill 3309—also known as the Innovation Act—was a
proposed amendment to Title 35 of the U.S. Code.90 If enacted, the
Innovation Act would have altered many aspects of patent
litigation.91 Of particular interest to this Note are the proposed
pleading standards for patent infringement that the Innovation Act
would have required. In addition to the general requirements of
Form 18, the Innovation Act would have required plaintiffs to: (1)
identify each claim of each patent that is allegedly infringed;92 (2)
identify, for each claim given, each “accused instrumentality”93 that
allegedly infringes; and (3) provide, if known, “the name or model
number of each accused instrumentality,” or, “if there is no name or
model number, a description of each accused instrumentality.”94
In addition to this modest increase in required information, the
Innovation Act would have also required the pleadings to provide,
for each accused instrumentality, a clear statement of: (1) “where
each element of each claim ... is found within the accused instru-
89. Compare H.R. 3309 § 3(a)(1), with Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship
Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015), and Support Technology and Research for Our
Nation’s Growth Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. §§ 101(11), 106 (2015) (noting the
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were scheduled to take effect in
December 2015, and providing that Form 18—if still in existence—shall be eliminated within
one year of enactment of the Act, but not providing specific pleading requirements), and
Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013), and S.
1013 § 2(a).
90. H.R. 3309 § 3(a)(1). The Bill passed the House but has not moved any further in the
process. See id. 
91. The Innovation Act would alter many aspects of patent litigation, such as altering the
fee shifting mechanism, limiting discovery, requiring additional disclosure, and setting out
circumstances that, if met, would trigger an automatic stay of actions against customers. See
id. §§ 3(b), 3(d), 4(a), 5(a). See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 283-87 (discussing the
reform bills introduced in the 113th Congress).
92. That is, language such as “the defendant infringes at least claim 1 of the plaintiff’s
patent” would be sufficient for claim 1 only.
93. An accused instrumentality is the “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.” H.R. 3309 § 3(a)(3).
94. Id. § 3(a)(4).
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mentality;” and (2) how, “with detailed specificity, ... each limitation
of each claim ... is met by the accused instrumentality.”95
If the Innovation Act had been enacted, the proposed pleading
standards would have posed a drastically higher burden for plain-
tiffs than those required in the Form 18 era.96 Moreover, these stan-
dards would have very likely required more detail than what most
district courts have required since plausibility pleading became the
controlling standard.97
Moreover, the specific standard requiring a statement of where
and how each element is practiced by the accused instrumentality
appears to be the equivalent of the infringement contentions that
are required under various local patent rules, such as those in the
Northern District of California and the Eastern District of Texas.98
Requiring what are effectively infringement contentions to be in-
cluded with the complaint would be a deviation from those districts,
however, because neither district requires the preliminary infringe-
ment contentions to be included in the complaint.99 If the Innovation
Act (or substantial equivalent) were to become law, it would,
presumably, supersede such local rules.100 
95. Id. § 3(a)(5). The pleading requirements also demand other information, such as a
description of the plaintiff’s principal business and a list of other lawsuits in which the same
patent is being asserted. Id. § 3(a)(8)-(9). However, any omitted requirements are beyond the
scope of this Note.
96. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288-89.
97. Id. at 289 (“Applying the Twombly/Iqbal standard will modestly increase the amount
of detail required in a complaint for direct patent infringement. The recent legislative
proposals, by contrast, would effect a dramatic leap from the minimal requirements of Form
18 to a requirement that plaintiffs plead ‘with detailed specificity’ how the defendant
infringes.” (quoting H.R. 3309 § 3(a)(5)(B))).
98. Compare H.R. 3309 § 3(a)(5) (requiring a showing of where and how each element of
each asserted claim is found within the accused instrumentality), with N. DIST. OF CAL.,
PATENT L.R. 3-1(c) (requiring a chart showing where each element of each asserted claim is
found within each accused instrumentality), and E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-1(c)
(requiring the same information as Northern District of California). Notably, and in contrast
to the Innovation Act, the Local Rules for the Northern District of California and the Eastern
District of Texas do not require an explanation of how the accused instrumentality practices
each element. See infra Part II.C.
99. See N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-1 (requiring disclosure of asserted claims and
infringement contentions no later than fourteen days after the Initial Case Management
Conference); E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-1 (requiring disclosure of infringement conten-
tions no later than ten days before the Initial Case Management Conference).
100. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.”); cf. La Belle, supra note 12, at 68 (“For example, the Innovation Act
heightens the pleading standard for patent cases and bifurcates discovery, but is silent as to
2017] PATENT INFRINGEMENT 319
The strict pleading requirements given in the Innovation Act
would likely have gone too far, however. Requiring the pleadings to
give “detailed specificity” as to “where” and, particularly, “how” each
limitation of each asserted claim is practiced by the accused instru-
mentality101 carries a serious risk of closing the courthouse doors to
plaintiffs with legitimate infringement claims.102 This risk is quite
likely when a plaintiff’s patent covers, for example, manufacturing
or software processes or methods, because often such processes or
methods are done behind closed doors.103 Plaintiffs in those types of
situations would need discovery to fully develop an infringement
theory.104 And although the Innovation Act would have “excuse[d]
plaintiffs from pleading the required facts if the relevant informa-
tion ‘[wa]s not reasonably accessible,’” this might have simply cre-
ated more confusion.105 A court faced with such a situation would
have “to look beyond the pleadings to determine whether the plain-
tiff ha[d] neglected to include in its complaint information about the
defendant’s acts of infringement that the plaintiff could ‘reasonably’
have obtained.”106 Ultimately, without providing a better mechanism
for courts to deal with complaints that allege secretive infringement,
the Innovation Act’s heightened pleading requirements would have
likely gone too far, making it too difficult for meritorious plaintiffs
to survive a motion to dismiss.
how these new procedures will interact with local patent rules.”).
101. H.R. 3309 § (3)(a)(5) (emphasis added).
102. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 290-91 (claiming patent holders with legitimate claims
may be unable to plead with sufficient specificity under the proposed rules).
103. Id. at 290 (“Some patent holders with legitimate infringement claims may be unable
to provide the required specificity because patent infringement often occurs in secret, for
instance, in research-and-development or production facilities to which the patent holder does
not have access.”).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 291 (quoting H.R. 3309 § 3(a)). Notably, neither House Bill 2639 nor Senate Bill
1013 provide this exception. Instead, they merely include the words “if known” as a modifier
to the paragraph requiring the identification of the name or model number of the accused
instrumentality. See Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong.
§ 2(a)(4) (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2013). 
106. Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 291 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 106 (2013)). 
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B. Local Patent Rules
The following discussion proceeds in three parts. First, it gives
background information on local patent rules. Second, it briefly dis-
cusses how the various local rules—focusing on infringement con-
tentions—streamline patent procedure. And third, it discusses how
substantively different results can occur in each locality. Each Sec-
tion uses various districts as examples—both those districts with
rules and those without.
1. Background on Local Patent Rules
Patent cases can present unique challenges. As a result, district
courts across the country have adopted local procedural rules for
patent cases. The Northern District of California was the first dis-
trict to do so when it adopted its Patent Local Rules.107 Since then,
at least twenty-nine other districts have followed suit.108 However,
not all districts have adopted local patent rules.109 Several patent
“hot spots,” namely the Central District of California, the District of
Delaware, the Southern District of Florida, and the Eastern District
of Virginia, do not have official local patent rules.110 
Although the various local patent rules vary significantly in
substance and scope,111 “every district court with local patent rules
requires early disclosure of infringement contentions.”112 These pre-
liminary infringement contentions function similarly to, and effec-
tively supplement, the complaint in many districts.113 Generally
speaking, an infringement contention must specify each claim of
107. James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the
Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 965, 979 (2009).
108. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 65. Rule 83 authorizes district courts to adopt local
rules governing their practice as long as they are consistent with, but do not duplicate, the
Federal Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
109. La Belle, supra note 12, at 95-96.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 88.
112. Id. at 105. 
113. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 95-97 (noting that in some localities, patent holders
“must provide infringement contentions within days of the initial case status conference”); La
Belle, supra note 12, at 104-07 (claiming local disclosure requirements function as “de facto
heightened pleading standards”).
2017] PATENT INFRINGEMENT 321
each patent that is allegedly infringed; name or describe each ac-
cused instrumentality; and show, through the use of a chart, where
each element of each asserted claim is found within each accused
instrumentality.114 In many districts these contentions are required
early on in the process, often before any meaningful discovery has
taken place.115 Accordingly, such local rules requiring early disclo-
sure of infringement contentions often function as de facto plead-
ing standards.116
The goal of the various local patent rules—especially those
requiring early disclosure of infringement contentions—is to stream-
line complex patent cases by requiring parties to crystallize their
theories early on in the case.117 This results in narrower and more
focused discovery, which lowers the cost and improves the pace of
patent litigation.118
However, these infringement contention requirements (or lack
thereof) can substantively affect the outcome of patent cases.119
Exactly when the infringement contentions must be disclosed, as
well as the level of detail required therein, varies across the
districts.120 Moreover, not all districts have local rules governing
patent cases.121 These differences result in discrepancies across the
114. See, e.g., N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-1; E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-1(a)-(c).
Counterclaims for invalidity are subject to similar requirements. See, e.g., N. DIST. OF CAL.,
PATENT L.R. 3-3; E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-3. The issues created in that area, however,
are beyond the scope of this Note.
115. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96; La Belle, supra note 12, at 96. In some districts,
however, these contentions are not required until considerably later in the process. See La
Belle, supra note 12, at 96. The local rules that require early disclosure most closely imitate
pleading requirements. See id. at 105.
116. Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 95-97; La Belle, supra note 12, at 104-07.
117. See, e.g., Cwik, supra note 84, at *1-3; La Belle, supra note 12, at 98.
118. See Cwik, supra note 84, at *1-3. The various local rules govern many other aspects
of patent litigation. See generally La Belle, supra note 12, at 96-99 (discussing the various
ways local patent rules govern substantive patent law in their jurisdictions). However, these
additional aspects and their implications are beyond the scope of this Note.
119. See Cwik, supra note 84, at *3 (“[C]hoice of venue can be unfortunately outcome
determinative, because of the differences in local patent rules.”); Gollwitzer, supra note 13,
at 96 (discussing how the various local rules—and differing interpretation of such rules—can
result in “case-dispositive differences”); La Belle, supra note 12, at 99 (discussing how a
plaintiff in one case “lost its patent infringement claim by failing to comply with the local
patent rules”).
120. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 95-97.
121. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 95.
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districts, offending the uniformity principles of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and U.S. Patent Law.122 
2. The Advantages of Local Rules Requiring Infringement
Contentions
The early disclosure of infringement contentions requires plain-
tiffs to conduct adequate pre-suit investigations123 and prevents
“‘shifting sands’ litigation tactics.”124 Thus, these requirements
address the problem that some scholars have pointed to as an
enabler of patent litigation abuse.125 With the need to conduct
significant pre-suit investigation in places like the Northern District
of California, patent trolls will be less able to file frivolous lawsuits
against large corporate defendants in the hopes of a favorable
settlement.126 Rather, with such requirements in place, defendants
will not face significant discovery costs unless plaintiffs are able to
earn their way to discovery by making sufficiently detailed infringe-
ment contentions.127 In other words, once a plaintiff does raise suf-
ficient infringement contentions, discovery will be more narrowly
122. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 97; La Belle, supra note 12, at 102-03. 
123. Cwik, supra note 84, at *3 (“One key result of the adoption of local patent rules is that
the parties now have to ‘drive their stake in the ground’ as to specific theories asserted.”).
124. Trans Video Elecs., Ltd. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 278 F.R.D. 505, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2011),
aff’d, 475 F. App’x 334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
125. See Moore, supra note 1, at 484-89 (discussing how notice pleading lowers costs for
plaintiffs, increases costs for defendants, and prevents early dismissal); see also Sudarshan,
supra note 1, at 172-77 (noting that in nuisance suits the “onus of discovery production” lies
largely with defendants); supra Part I.C.
126. See Moore, supra note 1, at 494-96, 504-05 (discussing how heightened pleading
requirements for infringement cases could help curb litigation abuse and admitting that local
rules requiring early disclosure have taken a step in this direction, but noting these local rules
do not apply everywhere and are not uniform).
127. See, e.g., Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., No. C 09-01152 SI, 2010 WL
2991257, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (“[U]ntil plaintiff meets the burden of providing
infringement contentions compliant with Patent L.R. 3-1, the Court will not order defendant
to proceed with discovery.” (quoting Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., No. C 09-01152
SI, 2010 WL 1135762, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010))). 
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tailored,128 which will streamline future events in the case, particu-
larly claim construction.129
3. Infringement Contentions and How a Lack of Uniformity in
Procedure Substantively Impacts Patent Litigation
It is no secret that variation among the districts in local proce-
dure can lead to forum shopping.130 Variations in the local rules lead
to forum shopping precisely because they can have a substantive
effect on the outcome of cases.131 This Section generally focuses on,
and compares, the Northern District of California and Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, because although the rules in each district are
substantially similar, they have contrasting reputations: the former
is favored by defendants, whereas the latter is favored by plain-
tiffs.132 However, it will also reference other districts to further
illustrate key discrepancies.
Local patent rules can cause disparity across districts before a
case even moves beyond the pleadings.133 Some districts, like the
Northern District of California and Eastern District of Texas, re-
quire disclosure very early on in the case, before discovery can
occur.134 However, other districts’ local rules, such as those adopted
by the Northern District of Illinois, contemplate long periods of
discovery before requiring final infringement contentions.135 Rules
on amending the contentions also vary from district to district.136
Even setting aside the literal differences of the various local rules,
128. See, e.g., Connectel, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 526, 527 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
(“[W]hen parties ... crystallize their infringement theories before stating their preliminary
infringement contentions ... the case ... focus[es] discovery ... and narrow[s] issues.”).
129. See, e.g., Trans Video Elecs., Ltd., 278 F.R.D. at 510 (finding the plaintiff’s tactical
decision to withhold a claim inconsistent with another “shifting sands litigation tactic”).
130. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 99. See generally Woodhouse, supra note 12.
131. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
132. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 99-100.
133. See, e.g., Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (E.D.
Tex. 2005) (“The Patent Rules demonstrate high expectations as to plaintiffs’ preparedness
before bringing suit, requiring plaintiffs to disclose their preliminary infringement conten-
tions before discovery has even begun.”).
134. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96; see also Cwik, supra note 84, at *5-6; La Belle,
supra note 12, at 100-02.
135. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96.
136. See id.
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districts with substantially similar rules interpret them
differently.137 Finally, “[b]esides these comprehensive rules,” many
districts do not have local rules, and some judges (whether or not in
a district with local rules) employ “local-local” rules for patent
cases.138 All these discrepancies can result in differing treatment of
cases that are otherwise effectively still at the pleadings stage.139
In the Northern District of California, infringement contentions
are required to be disclosed within fourteen days after the case
management conference,140 at which point no meaningful discovery
will have yet taken place.141 In the Eastern District of Texas, they
must be disclosed “[ten] days before the Initial Case Management
Conference,”142 which is “before discovery has even begun.”143 In con-
trast, other districts specifically contemplate long periods of discov-
ery before final contentions are due.144 In the Northern District of
Illinois, for example, it is highly unlikely that a plaintiff’s infringe-
ment claims will be indefinitely stayed or dismissed145 because the
local rules specifically provide for up to “twenty-three weeks of
discovery before ‘final’ contentions are due.”146
137. See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 12, at 100-02 (noting that the procedural rules that
apply in patent litigation depend on the “district, division, judge, or even case”).
138. Id. at 88-92, 96.
139. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96; La Belle, supra note 12, at 103-06; see also
Steinmetz, supra note 35, at 512-13.
140. N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-1.
141. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96 (“The Northern District of California enforces its
strict infringement contention requirements even in complex cases where the patent holder
may have a difficult time analyzing the accused infringer’s product before filing suit.”); La
Belle, supra note 12, at 100-01 (discussing the Northern District of California’s defendant-
friendly local rules).
142. E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-1 (emphasis added).
143. Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
144. Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96.
145. In the Northern District of California, for example, if the initial infringement
contentions are insufficient due to a lack of discovery, the court may stay any further
discovery until the infringement contentions are satisfactory; this can eventually result in
dismissal of the case. See, e.g., Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., No. C 09-01152 SI,
2010 WL 2991257, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010).
146. Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96; see N. DIST. OF ILL., PATENT L.R. 2.1, 3.1. To be sure,
the Northern District of Illinois requires initial infringement contentions early on, like many
other districts. Compare N. DIST. OF ILL., PATENT L.R. 2.1-2.2 (requiring disclosure of initial
infringement contentions within twenty-eight days of defendant’s answer), with N. DIST. OF
CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-1 (requiring disclosure of infringement contentions no “later than [four-
teen] days after the Initial Case Management Conference”). However, the fact that the North-
ern District of Illinois’s local rules provide a mechanism for amending the contentions—
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In addition to variations in the timing requirements, the North-
ern District of California and the Eastern District of Texas have
different rules regarding amending infringement contentions. The
Northern District of California does not allow parties to amend their
contentions unless the court so orders “upon a timely showing of
good cause.”147 In contrast, the Eastern District of Texas allows
parties to amend their infringement contentions “without leave of
court” so long as the party “believes in good faith that the Court’s
Claim Construction Ruling so requires, not later than 30 days after
service by the Court of its Claim Construction Ruling.”148
Aside from literal differences in some of the various rules, dis-
tricts vary in the way they interpret rules that are virtually identi-
cal.149 The Northern District of California and Eastern District of
Texas have virtually identical requirements for what must be in-
cluded in infringement contentions.150 However, despite the fact that
the Eastern District of Texas requires disclosure even earlier than
the Northern District of California,151 the Eastern District of Texas
is favored by plaintiffs, whereas defendants favor the Northern Dis-
trict of California and “often seek transfer to that court.”152 This
discrepancy is because the Northern District of California has a rep-
utation for strictly enforcing its infringement contention require-
ments.153
In the Northern District of California, failing (or being unable)
to make sufficient infringement contention requirements can
effectively a mandatory one, see N. DIST. OF ILL., PATENT L.R. 3.1 (requiring final infringement
contentions within twenty-one weeks after the due date for the initial infringement
contentions)—stands in stark contrast to the Northern District of California. See supra notes
140-41 and accompanying text.
147. N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-6.
148. E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-6(a)(1). Leave of the court and a showing of good cause
is required for any other amendment or supplement to infringement contentions. Id. 3-6(b).
To be fair, the Northern District of California’s Local Rules list a few nonexhaustive examples
that “may” support a finding of good cause, and included in those examples is an adverse
claim construction ruling. N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L. R. 3-6 (emphasis added).
149. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96; La Belle, supra note 12, at 100-02.
150. See, e.g., N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-1(b); E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT  L.R. 3-1(b).
151. Compare N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT L.R. 3-1 (requiring disclosure of asserted claims
and infringement contentions no later than fourteen days after the Initial Case Management
Conference), with E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-1 (requiring disclosure no later than ten
days before the Initial Case Management Conference).
152. La Belle, supra note 12, at 99-101; see Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96.
153. La Belle, supra note 12, at 100.
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effectively result in a successful motion to dismiss. To satisfy the
infringement contentions, “a ‘plaintiff [must] compare an accused
product to its patents on a claim by claim, element by element basis
for at least one of each defendant’s products.’ To make such a
comparison, ‘reverse engineering or its equivalent is required.’”154 If
a plaintiff is unable to do this because of financial limitations, like
in Bender v. Maxim Integrated Products, discovery will be stayed—
further preventing that plaintiff from constructing sufficient
contentions.155 Eventually, if the plaintiff is unable to remedy the
infringement contentions’ deficiencies, the suit will be dismissed.156
On the other hand, the Eastern District of Texas is more lenient
with interpretation.157 For example, in a 2005 case in which the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ source code for various video
games was infringing its patent, the district court denied the de-
fendants’ Motion to Compel Supplemental Disclosures Pursuant to
Patent Rule 3-1(c).158 In denying the motion, the court explained
that the local patent rules “demonstrate high expectations as to
plaintiffs’ preparedness before bringing suit, requiring plaintiffs to
disclose their preliminary infringement contentions before discovery
has even begun.”159 However, in cases like this, the court explained,
discovery is necessary to give specific infringement contentions.160
That is, “prior to discovery, plaintiffs usually only have access to the
manifestation of the defendants’ allegedly infringing source code
154. Renesas Tech. Corp. v. Nanya Tech. Corp., No. C03-05709JFHRL, 2004 WL 2600466,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2004) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Network
Caching Tech., L.L.C. v. Novell, Inc., No. C-01-2079-VRW, 2002 WL 32126128, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 13, 2002)); see also Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., No. C 09-01152 SI, 2010 WL
2991257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010); La Belle, supra note 12, at 101.
155. See Bender, 2010 WL 2991257, at *5-6 (staying discovery until Bender could produce
sufficiently detailed infringement contentions); see also Network Caching Tech., L.L.C. v.
Novell, Inc., No C-01-2079-VRW, 2002 WL 32126128, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2002);
Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 290 (“[D]istricts such as the ... Northern District of California
generally protect the defendant from responding to discovery requests seeking to elicit ...
infringement contentions before the deadlines for disclosure set in the local rules.”).
156. See Bender, 2010 WL 2991257, at *6 (“[P]laintiff is directed to serve his Third
Amended Infringement Contentions no later than August 20, 2010. In the event plaintiff’s
amended contentions are still deficient, the Court will be prepared to reconsider Maxim’s
requests to strike the contentions and to dismiss this action.”).
157. Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96.
158. Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 559 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
159. Id. at 560.
160. See id.
2017] PATENT INFRINGEMENT 327
and not the code itself.”161 Notably, the Eastern District of Texas has
recognized, in some cases, that some discovery will be necessary to
construct sufficient infringement contentions.162
Discrepancies aside, not all districts have comprehensive local
rules for patent cases.163 Indeed, many popular districts for patent
litigation, like “the Central District of California, the District of
Delaware, the Southern District of Florida, and the Eastern District
of Virginia,” have not adopted formal local rules.164 The districts
without local rules simply apply the standard pleading require-
ments to complaints for patent infringement.165 And for a long time,
these pleading requirements were governed by Form 18 (at least
for claims of direct infringement), which required considerably
less than typical infringement contentions.166
Perhaps even more problematic than the discrepancies in proce-
dure discussed above, from a uniformity perspective, are the so-
called “local-local” rules that some district court judges utilize.167
With no official local patent rules and one of the busiest patent
dockets in the country, the District of Delaware provides a good ex-
ample.168 
Each of Delaware’s four Article III judges169 has implemented
special rules for patent cases, providing various procedures, such
as special scheduling orders, voir dire questions, and claim
161. Id.; see also Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 96.
162. See, e.g., Am. Video Graphics, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
163. La Belle, supra note 12, at 95-96.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 105-06.
166. See id.; see also supra Parts I.B-C.
167. La Belle, supra note 12, at 88.
168. Id. at 89.
169. Since the drafting of this Note, one of these four judges, Judge Robinson, transitioned
to senior status in February 2017; she officially retired on July 14, 2017. See Announcement,
U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Del., Happy Birthday to SENIOR Judge Sue L. Robin-
son! (Feb. 3, 2017),  http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/news/2017/February/03/
ANNOUNCEMENTJudge%20Sue%20L%20Robinson.pdf [https://perma.cc/C25Q-WSBW];
About the Court: Judges, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DEL., http://www.ded.
uscourts. gov/judge_20 [https://perma.cc/P92S-EV4C]. Judge Sleet also transitioned to senior
status as of May 1, 2017, but he “intends to render substantial judicial service as a Senior
Judge.” Announcement, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Del., Honorable Gregory M. Sleet to
Take Senior Status (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/news/2017/
April/13/GMS%20Senior%20Status%20Notice.pdf [https://perma.cc/H59H-Y6QA].
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construction guidelines.170 The “local-local” rules vary among the
Delaware judges, though some similarities exist.171 They all, for
example, use patent-specific scheduling orders, but each judge’s
scheduling order is different.172 However, the discrepancies are
notable:
Judge Sleet requires parties to seek permission to file summary
judgment motions; Judge Robinson limits the type of definitions
parties may propose in claim construction; and Judge Stark
mandates that parties provide the court with a tutorial on the
relevant technology. Judges Stark and Andrews permit motions
in limine, but Judges Sleet and Robinson do not. Judges Stark
and Robinson require early disclosure of the plaintiff’s “damages
model” and defendant’s sales figures, but Judges Andrews and
Sleet do not.173
The District of Delaware is not alone in utilizing local-local rules.
For example, some judges in the Northern District of Texas and
Central District of California, as well as Judge Crabb in the West-
ern District of Wisconsin, utilize local-local rules.174 Additionally,
“these local-local rules exist even in courts with comprehensive local
patent rules.”175 About one quarter of the judges in the Northern
District of California “have particularized patent rules above and
beyond what the district” mandates as a whole.176
Of course, one could simply advise patent clients to avoid the less
favorable districts; however, this is not always possible. First, forum
selection may be out of the client’s control. Even for would-be plain-
tiffs, there is a risk of a motion to transfer venue.177 On the other
170. La Belle, supra note 12, at 89-90.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (footnotes omitted).
174. Id. at 90.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Gollwitzer, supra note 13, at 97 (“[M]oving a case pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1404]
can have case-altering consequences when the case is transferred from a district that allows
liberal discovery in line with Rule 26 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to a district that
requires detailed final contentions before taking any discovery. Indeed, accused infringers
strategically use section 1404 to transfer cases to defendant-friendly forums that limit pre-
infringement contention discovery such as the Northern District of California. The potentially
case-dispositive implications of transfer demonstrate that local patent rules are flouting the
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hand, defendants sued by patent trolls may have no realistic ability
to transfer to a more favorable venue because PAEs are generally
incorporated to be subject to personal jurisdiction in only a single,
favorable jurisdiction.178 And in so doing the only appropriate venue
for litigation will be that sole, favored jurisdiction.179 This is simply
one additional reason parties tend to settle with patent trolls.180 
 At bottom, when applying what is supposed to be a standardized
federal law (both substantive and procedural), a case should not be
treated substantively differently based on the forum of choice.181 As
one commentator has argued, “The outcome of a patent suit, and
certainly the question of whether it even gets to trial, should not
depend on where it is pled. Even if it does in reality, the law should
not sanction this result.”182
C. Abrogation of Rule 84 and the Federal Appendix of Forms
The abrogation of Form 18 is a step in the right direction. Not
only has it removed the confusion of applying Twombly and Iqbal’s
plausibility standard to a form that on its face would not suffice, but
now district courts will also apply the same pleading standard in all
infringement cases across the country.183 However, while all district
courts are now applying the same standard, this standard is inter-
preted in many different ways, with some courts requiring more
detailed pleadings than others.184 Without a more specifically de-
fined standard or rule—and with varying local patent rules
potentially altering courts’ judgments—patent law will not be uni-
form across all districts.
limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 83. Winning or losing a transfer
motion should not decide the outcome of a case arising out of a supposedly uniform body of
federal patent law.”).
178. Hauer, supra note 71, at 372.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 371-73.
181. See generally La Belle, supra note 12, at 94-111 (discussing local patent rules and
their negative effect on uniformity of patent law).
182. Steinmetz, supra note 35, at 513.
183. See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 288-91.
184. See id. at 289-90.
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Some courts have required the complaint to allege element-by-
element how the accused product infringed.185 In Raindance Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc., the District of Delaware applied
the post-December 1, 2015, direct infringement pleading stan-
dards.186 The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim because the complaint failed to allege
infringement element-by-element.187 The court specifically provided
two of the patent claims in issue188 and found that at least one
element from each claim was not alleged in the complaint to be
practiced by the accused products.189 For example, one of the claims
provided for, among other things, “applying a same constant
pressure to the carrier fluid,” but as the court explained: “There is
nothing in the complaint (at least so far as [the judge could] see)
that hints at the role of pressure in Defendant’s products.”190 With
respect to the other claim, the reasoning was substantially the
same, and it was not clear whether every element was met: “It is not
obvious to [the judge] that what Plaintiffs describe is an
‘autocatalytic reaction.’ The requirements of the next to last element
might be met, but involves quite a bit of supposition.”191
Similarly, the Eastern District of Virginia found insufficient a
complaint that failed to provide element-by-element allegations.192
In Asghari-Kamrani v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, the court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the complaint
failed “to specify which features of USAA’s website[, the accused
instrumentality,] correspond[ed] to the Central- and External-
Entities” found in every claim of the plaintiffs’ asserted patent.193
And although the plaintiffs adequately identified four specific
features of the website that infringed, their complaint failed to
185. See, e.g., Asghari-Kamrani v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 2:15cv478, 2016 WL
1253533, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2016); Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc., No.
15-152-RGA, 2016 WL 927143, at *1-2 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2016).
186. See Raindance Techs., 2016 WL 927143, at *1-2.
187. See id. at *2-3.
188. The two claims were from two different method patents, id. at *2, which were of a
total of six still asserted in the litigation, id. at *1 n.1.
189. Id. at *1-3.
190. Id. at *2.
191. Id.
192. See Asghari-Kamrani v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 2:15CV478, 2016 WL 1253533,
at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2016).
193. Id. at *3.
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provide any information as to how these features infringed the
patent.194
In contrast, some courts have found that all Iqbal requires is for
the plaintiff to allege that “a specific product” infringes the asserted
patents “by virtue of certain specific characteristics.”195 That is,
plaintiffs are “not required to list which of the claims in the patent
have been infringed in its pleading.”196
A recent case in the Central District of California provides a good
example of this standard at work.197 In InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney,
Co., the district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss
InCom’s claim for direct patent infringement.198 In so doing, the
court found that InCom stated a plausible claim of infringement
under Twombly and Iqbal because, in its complaint, InCom de-
scribed how its patented Attendance Tracking System worked.
InCom explained that the system used Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion (RFID) technology and ID tags “to track human presence in
large volumes”; furthermore, InCom asserted that “prior to its
invention, such technology was unavailable because RFID did not
work effectively near human beings.”199 Finally, InCom identified
“specific products developed, manufactured and used by Defendants
which, like Plaintiff’s system, track human presence in large vol-
umes.”200 In sum, InCom “stated a plausible claim for direct in-
fringement by specifically identifying Defendants’ products and
alleging that they perform the same unique function as Plaintiff’s
patented system.”201
Aside from these interpretive differences, “some district courts
have justified their refusal to dismiss sparsely pled claims of patent
infringement on the ground that these early deadlines for disclo-
sure will remedy any prejudice to the defendant.”202 Indeed, the
194. Id. at *4.
195. Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-CV-8814 (SAS), 2016 WL 1070853, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2016); see InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV15-3011 PSG (MRWx),
2016 WL 4942032, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016).
196. Iron Gate Sec., 2016 WL 1070853, at *3.
197. See InCom, Corp., 2016 WL 4942032, at *2-3.
198. Id. at *2-5.
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 290; see also Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14,
2009 WL 704138, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (explaining that strict pleading
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Northern District of California recently did just that.203 The court
assumed Form 18 no longer set the standard, yet denied the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, explaining that “defendant’s argument
that it should be entitled to notice at the pleading stage of which
specific products infringed on which specific claims in the patents is
belied by both the local patent rules and Federal Circuit author-
ity.”204 The court continued: “The complaint’s allegations relating to
plaintiff’s direct infringement claim against defendant are sufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss. Moreover, under the patent rules,
the plaintiff is required to serve detailed disclosures later this
summer. The Court is not inclined to belabor the Rule 12 motion
practice.”205
Ultimately, exactly how much information is required in a com-
plaint to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal, now that Form 18 no longer
controls, is unclear. And, as discussed above, many district court
rulings are not consistent with others. For these reasons, a more
specific, uniform standard will benefit both the courts and litigants
alike by promoting consistency and predictability.
III. FEDERAL RULES OF PATENT PROCEDURE AND THE PROPOSED
RULE
Professor Megan M. La Belle is advocating for a “comprehensive
national patent procedural reform that is informed by and benefits
from the local patent rules experiment.”206 Exactly what rules would
be in a complete set of Federal Rules of Patent Procedure is, of
course, unknown at this stage. But the idea is to address the issues
with uniformity, as discussed above, while embracing and utilizing
the successful aspects of the various local patent rules to create a
requirements “would undermine the purpose of the Court’s Local Patent Rules”); Burdman
& Sauers, supra note 7, at 4 (noting there is the possibility “courts with extensive ... early
disclosure requirements will continue to point to those rules and adopt fairly low pleading
requirements for allegations of infringement”).
203. See Windy City Innovations, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1115
(N.D. Cal. 2016).
204. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hosp. Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d
790, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Interestingly, the Federal Circuit case cited by the court was
decided around fifteen years before Form 18 was abrogated. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
205. Windy City Innovations, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1115.
206. La Belle, supra note 12, at 68.
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better procedural regime overall. This Note proposes a specific Rule
that would be merely one small piece of the suggested Federal Rules
of Patent Procedure. Adopting the Proposed Rule as part of a set of
federal rules would ensure uniformity throughout the nation in
patent litigation.207 
The Proposed Rule is intended to address the pleading require-
ments for direct patent infringement and provide an approach for
connecting these requirements with infringement contentions. And
because its purpose is to preserve uniformity among the districts, it
would, if enacted, supersede the various local rules providing for
infringement contentions.208 The ultimate goal is to promote effici-
ency and predictability by providing specific requirements, while
preserving fairness through allowing a context-specific inquiry. 
The Proposed Rule involves a two-step process. First, it adopts a
“heightened” pleading standard for direct infringement that is more
defendant friendly than that employed during the Form 18 era. This
“heightened” standard would be effectively what many district
courts have required since the abrogation of Rule 84 and Form 18;209
however, it would allow for a res ipsa loquitur-Like Exception (RIL
Exception) and Shifting Mechanism (RIL Shifting Mechanism).
Second, other than in the limited circumstances in which the Shift-
ing Mechanism would apply, the complaint would set the foundation
for, and limit, the initial infringement contentions. The infringe-
ment contentions would be due a short time after the defendant’s
answer or, when the Shifting Mechanism applies, after limited
discovery.
Crucially, the Proposed Rule requires a context-specific inquiry
into the adequacy of the pleadings. The Proposed Rule’s intention is
to protect vulnerable, but legitimate, plaintiffs, while also protecting
defendants from being forced to litigate against vague, and often
meritless, accusations. This Proposed Rule would likely increase the
pre-suit costs for plaintiffs, because plaintiffs would need to conduct
207. See generally La Belle, supra note 12, at 65-68 (discussing the need for the promulga-
tion of uniform, national rules to govern patent litigation).
208. For consistency’s sake, the principles of the Proposed Rule could (and if enacted,
should) be used to inform changes to other aspects of patent litigation, including indirect and
contributory infringement, as well as invalidity. However, detailed discussion of those topics
is beyond the scope of this Note.
209. See supra Parts II.B-C.
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more significant investigations in order to make sufficient allega-
tions and infringement contentions.210 The increased burden on
plaintiffs, however, is a small price to pay for the needed adjust-
ments in modern patent litigation. Indeed, in many patent cases
plaintiffs are able to employ counsel on a contingency fee basis,211 so
the added cost will not be too great a deterrent if the case truly has
merit. The Proposed Rule as a whole will be stricter than the old
Form 18 standard without being so strict as to preclude meritorious
plaintiffs from filing suit against secretive infringement.
A. Plausibility Pleading with a Res Ipsa Loquitur-Like Exception
Under the Proposed Rule, the complaint must allege facts to sup-
port plausible infringement as required by Twombly and Iqbal.212 To
meet this burden, a complaint for patent infringement would still
need to include the five basic requirements of Form 18: (1) the
grounds for jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff owned the
patent(s) at issue; (3) a statement that the defendant infringed the
patent(s) by making, using, or selling some device(s) embodying the
patent(s); (4) a statement that the plaintiff gave the defendant
written notice of such infringement; and (5) a demand for relief.213
Additionally, the complaint would need to identify with reason-
able specificity the instrumentality that allegedly infringes. The
plaintiff would also need to specify which claims are allegedly in-
fringed, and allege, element-by-element, facts showing that at least
one of the identified claims is infringed for each accused instrumen-
tality. The goal of these requirements is to put the defendant on
notice and to guide the scope of discovery. 
The specific pleading requirements for patent infringement cases,
as required by the District of New Hampshire’s local patent rules,
210. See Moore, supra note 1, at 494-95 (discussing how a higher pleading standard would
increase plaintiffs’ costs of filing an infringement suit because of the need to conduct more
thorough investigations).
211. See generally David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 338 (2012) (discussing why a substantial market for contin-
gent fee patent litigation developed over time).
212. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007); see also supra Parts I.B-C.
213. See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 18 (repealed 2015); see also Williams, supra note 23, at
322.
2017] PATENT INFRINGEMENT 335
illustrate the above substantive requirements.214 Specifically, under
the Proposed Rule, a complaint (or counterclaim) for direct infringe-
ment would need to include the following substantive allegations:
(1) a list of all products or processes (by model number, trade
name, or other specific identifying characteristic) for which the
claimant or counterclaimant has developed a good-faith basis for
alleging infringement, as of the time of filing the pleading; and
(2) at least one illustrative asserted patent claim (per asserted
patent) for each accused product or process.215
Furthermore, in undertaking the “context-specific task” required by
Iqbal,216 the type of technology involved in the asserted patents and
the nature of the accused instrumentalities must be taken into
account to determine whether a plaintiff has pled sufficient facts. In
this regard, the Proposed Rule would go one step further than the
New Hampshire Rule by requiring the allowance of the RIL Excep-
tion, which would ensure patent holders’ ability to seek judicial re-
dress for secretive infringement.217 In extraordinary circumstances
in which element-by-element allegations are impossible given the
nature of the accused instrumentality, such as with proprietary soft-
ware218 or interior use production devices,219 a plaintiff would still
need to make a showing that the accused instrumentality plausibly
infringes to survive a motion to dismiss. Under the Proposed Rule,
such a showing would be satisfied by a three-pronged, res ipsa
214. DIST. OF N.H., PATENT L.R. 2.1(a).
215. Id.
216. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
217. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is used in tort law to shift the burden of producing
evidence to establish a breach of duty from the plaintiff to the defendant when such evidence
is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Ybarra v.
Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944). It has three conditions:
(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and] (3) it must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
Id. (quoting PROSSER, TORTS 295 (1941)).
218. See, e.g., Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 559 (E.D.
Tex. 2005). 
219. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 290.
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loquitur-Like Pleading (the RIL Exception). Specifically, the com-
plaint would need to allege facts that show:
(1) that such a product or result would not ordinarily exist
without infringing the asserted patent;
(2) that the accused instrumentality is under the exclusive
control of the alleged infringer; and
(3) that plaintiff was not “contributorily negligent” in failing to
attempt to contact the alleged infringer to try to resolve the
dispute without court intervention.
The first prong of the RIL Exception mirrors the first condition of
a traditional res ipsa loquitur based negligence claim: “[T]he
accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence.”220 In the context of patent in-
fringement, this would require alleging something like, “It is un-
likely that the [accused instrumentality] or [the result or product of
the accused instrumentality or method] would exist or function as
it does without infringing Patent XXX because: [insert reason
here].”
The first prong of the RIL Exception would be satisfied by alle-
gations that explain both the unique capabilities of the invention
underlying the patent and how the accused instrumentality exhibits
those same unique capabilities. A recent case in the Central District
of California provides a simple example.221 In InCom Corp. v. Walt
Disney Co., the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim with respect to InCom’s claim for direct
patent infringement.222 In so doing, the court found that InCom had
stated a plausible claim of infringement under Twombly and Iqbal
because, in its complaint, InCom described how its patented Atten-
dance Tracking System worked by using Radio Frequency Identifi-
cation (RFID) technology and ID tags to track human presence in
large volumes; asserted that “prior to its invention, such technology
was unavailable because RFID did not work effectively near human
beings”; and named “specific products developed, manufactured and
220. Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 689 (quoting PROSSER, TORTS 295 (1941)).
221. See InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., CV15-3011 PSG (MRWx), 2016 WL 4942032, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016).
222. Id. at *2, *4-5.
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used by Defendants which, like Plaintiff ’s system, track human
presence in large volumes.”223
The second prong of the RIL Exception is analogous to the second
condition of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; however, there are two
caveats. First, in the patent infringement context, the “accused in-
strumentality” must be construed based on the asserted patent and
the claim of infringement. A case from the Eastern District of Texas
provides a good illustration of this nuance.224 In American Video
Graphics L.P. v. Electronic Arts, Inc., the plaintiff claimed that
fifteen video game manufacturers infringed its patent, and “iden-
tified roughly 800 games that it believe[d] use[d] infringing source
code.”225 In this case, the source code, and not the manifestation
thereof (the video games), is what might ultimately infringe the
patent.226 Therefore, under this test, the source code would be the
“accused instrumentality,” and not the games themselves. The
games, of course, would be useful in satisfying the first prong of the
RIL Exception.227
The second caveat is that the “exclusive control” requirement
must be construed more narrowly than under traditional res ipsa lo-
quitur doctrine. Under the traditional tort doctrine, the “exclusive
control” element considers whether one has a “right of control rather
than actual control.”228 However, in the patent context, the “exclu-
sive control” requirement must be more akin to whether something
is publicly or commercially available. For example, although the
video games, which embodied the source code at issue in American
Video Graphics, were publicly and commercially available, the code
itself was not; mere ownership of the games did not give access to
223. Id. at *3. Of course, this case was not applying the Proposed Rule, so although it is
unclear whether the accused instrumentalities in this case (Walt Disney’s attendance tracking
device, “MagicBand”), would satisfy the second prong of the RIL Exception, it appears likely
it would because such an attendance system would require some type of apparatus that keeps
track of the individual ID tags. See id. at *1. And such apparatus would likely be under the
exclusive control of Walt Disney. Cf. id.
224. See Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 559-61 (E.D. Tex.
2005).
225. Id. at 559.
226. See id. at 560.
227. Indeed, the plaintiff used the games for a similar purpose: it argued that “many of the
infringing features c[ould] be found throughout the game,” but there was no way “to accu-
rately indicate where the infringement [was] occur[ring] without the source code.” Id.
228. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944).
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the actual source code.229 Accordingly, the plaintiff needed, and the
court granted, discovery so it could provide clearer infringement
contentions.230 This result is illustrative of what the second prong of
the RIL Exception requires.
The third prong of the RIL Exception does not strictly follow the
third condition of the traditional res loquitur ipsa test. However,
this prong serves a similar purpose. The purpose of the doctrine of
contributory negligence—and its modern counterpart, comparative
negligence—is to discourage negligent behavior by barring (or
limiting the amount of) recovery if the plaintiff shared fault in the
accident.231 The purpose of the third prong of the RIL Exception is
to encourage plaintiffs to conduct genuine pre-suit investigations by
requiring that plaintiffs attempt to resolve the issue without
immediately involving the courts. In practice, this prong of the
exception will likely become a mere formality.232
The RIL Exception has a purpose similar to the “secret action”
test, which was proposed to address a similar problem in the field
of toxic and environmental torts.233 Complaints for toxic torts and
environmental claims “are frequently inadequate to live up to”
Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility standard.234 The “secret action”
test was proposed as a way to plead any cause of action the proof of
which depended on some secret action.235 This test has three
elements: 
(1) The claim accuses the defendant, in part, of a secret action, 
(2) the liability of the defendant hinges on that action, and 
(3) the surrounding circumstances are sufficient to create a rea-
sonable inference that the secret action was directly related to
the plaintiff’s injury.236
229. Am. Video Graphics, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61.
230. Id.
231. See William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1953).
232. Cf., e.g., InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., CV15-3011 PSG (MRWx), 2016 WL 4942032,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (noting that InCom wrote to Disney offering to license the
patents in suit before filing the instant case).
233. See Joseph I. Silverzweig, Note, The Secret Action Test: A Proposed Solution to the
New Plausibility Pleading, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 481, 482 (2011).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 498.
236. Id.
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Elements one and two of the test, taken together, closely corre-
spond to the second prong of the RIL Exception: the “exclusive
control” of the “accused instrumentality” prong.237 The third element
of this test very much mirrors the first prong of the RIL Exception;
indeed, the intent of the first prong of the RIL Exception is to
require a showing that “the surrounding circumstances are suffi-
cient to create a reasonable inference that” plaintiff’s patent is being
infringed.238 All in all, both the RIL Exception and the “secret ac-
tion” test seek to provide a solution to the dilemma created by the
plausibility pleading standards when certain facts are unknown or
unavailable to a would-be plaintiff.239
B. The Pleading Requirements’ Interaction with the Infringement
Contentions
The early disclosure of infringement contentions, required in
many local patent rules, offers many important benefits, including
streamlining discovery early on in the case and preventing “shifting
sands” litigation tactics.240 The Proposed Rule seeks to retain these
benefits while refining the requirements to work with the proposed
pleading requirements, given above.
Under the Proposed Rule, the allegations in the complaint would
form the basis of the infringement contentions.241 The infringement
contentions could expand the allegations only in detail; additional
claims or products could not be added after the complaint has been
filed. So, even though the pleading requirements would not tech-
nically require more than one claim of the asserted patent to be
alleged element-by-element under the Proposed Rule, the infringe-
ment contentions, and thus the case, would be limited to those spe-
cifically alleged patent claims.
There is one exception to this Proposed Rule’s limitation on
infringement contentions, however. When a plaintiff successfully
makes out an RIL Exception, then the RIL Shifting Mechanism
shifts the burden of discovery onto the defendant with respect to
237. See id.; supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
238. See Silverzweig, supra note 233, at 498; supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
239. See Silverzweig, supra note 233, at 498.
240. See supra Part II.B.2.
241. See supra Part II.B.2.
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the accused instrumentalities subject to the RIL Exception.242 With
the burden of discovery shifted, the defendant will be required to
disclose to the plaintiff the information the plaintiff requests, so
long as it is limited to infringement by the suspected instrumental-
ity. Finally, if discovery results in information that enables the
plaintiff to make out element-by-element allegations as required by
the Proposed Rule’s pleading requirements, then the plaintiff will
be permitted to file infringement contentions with respect to these
claims. 
Either way, the infringement contentions required by the
Proposed Rule, would need to include all the information required
by the Eastern District of Texas’s local rules. The Eastern District
of Texas’s local rules require, in essence, the plaintiff to identify
each accused instrumentality and provide a chart that shows “spec-
ifically where each element of each asserted claim is found within
each Accused Instrumentality.”243
242. The RIL Shifting Mechanism is inspired by the burden shifting function of the
traditional res ipsa loquitur doctrine; however, it is worth repeating that the RIL Shifting
Mechanism is not as extreme: it does not shift the entire burden of proof to the defendant,
simply the burden of initial discovery. It also takes inspiration from a recent decision from the
District of Idaho in which the Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that
“some limited discovery [would] be necessary” given the circumstances alleged in the
complaint. Rice v. Murakami, No. 1:13-cv-441-BLW, 2014 WL 2780977, at *2 (D. Idaho June
18, 2014) (“It would simply be unfair to require Rice—without discovery—to identify the role
of each defendant in what was likely a chaotic scene.”).
243. E. DIST. OF TEX., PATENT L.R. 3-1(c). Specifically, Rule 3-1 requires:
(a) Each claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed by each opposing
party;
(b) Separately for each asserted claim, each accused apparatus, product, device,
process, method, act, or other instrumentality (“Accused Instrumentality”) of
each opposing party of which the party is aware. This identification shall be as
specific as possible. Each product, device, and apparatus must be identified by
name or model number, if known. Each method or process must be identified by
name, if known, or by any product, device, or apparatus which, when used,
allegedly results in the practice of the claimed method or process;
(c) A chart identifying specifically where each element of each asserted claim is
found within each Accused Instrumentality, including for each element that
such party contends is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), the identity of the
structure(s), act(s), or material(s) in the Accused Instrumentality that performs
the claimed function;
(d) Whether each element of each asserted claim is claimed to be literally
present or present under the doctrine of equivalents in the Accused Instrumen-
tality;
(e) For any patent that claims priority to an earlier application, the priority date
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The purpose of restricting the infringement contentions to those
claims specifically enumerated in the complaint is to encourage
plaintiffs to conduct thorough pre-filing investigations. And because
the Proposed Rule will require the pleadings to allege, element-by-
element, how each accused product infringes each asserted patent
claim, the pleadings will be essentially as detailed as the infringe-
ment contentions required under the local rules in the Northern
District of California and Eastern District of Texas.244 Unlike in
those districts, however, plaintiffs will have a reliable path to dis-
covery for any alleged infringement that occurs in secret or whose
details are otherwise unavailable: this is the key purpose of the RIL
Exception and RIL Shifting Mechanism.245
CONCLUSION: HOW THE PROPOSED RULE STRIKES A BETTER
BALANCE
The procedures imposed by the Proposed Rule are simple. If the
suit really is frivolous—and not deserving of any discovery—the
defendant could use a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without being
subjected to burdensome and costly discovery.246 In the rare cases in
to which each asserted claim allegedly is entitled; and
(f) If a party claiming patent infringement wishes to preserve the right to rely,
for any purpose, on the assertion that its own apparatus, product, device, pro-
cess, method, act, or other instrumentality practices the claimed invention, the
party must identify, separately for each asserted claim, each such apparatus,
product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality that incorporates
or reflects that particular claim.
Id. 3-1.
244. The only structural difference will be that the pleadings, under the Proposed Rule,
need not have a literal claim chart attached. However, that might be the easiest way to make
element-by-element allegations.
245. Indeed, plaintiffs will be allowed limited discovery for all accused instrumentalities
and patent claims that have been successfully pled. From a practical matter, however, the
discovery related to any of the pleadings that would be sufficient under the Proposed Rule
even without the RIL Exception is unlikely to be used to supplement the infringement
contentions with greater detail because plaintiffs will want to keep their contentions as broad
as possible. See Cwik, supra note 84, at *4. A broader contention allows for more flexibility
should the infringement theories need to be tweaked as trial progresses. See id.
246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Moore, supra note 1, at 494-96. Of course,
plaintiffs would still be afforded one opportunity to amend their pleadings. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 15(a)(1). However, if a plaintiff fails to show substantial cause for any subsequent
amendments, the court should not grant leave to amend the complaint, and the suit should
be dismissed with prejudice. Cf. Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., No. C 09-01152 SI,
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which the plaintiff successfully invokes the RIL Exception, the
defendant would be subject to limited discovery to afford the
plaintiff an opportunity to create sufficient infringement conten-
tions. However, should the plaintiff, after the limited discovery
period expires, be unable to sufficiently chart out its contentions,
the defendant would have the opportunity to move to dismiss the
suit with prejudice through a renewed motion to dismiss.247 This
process would be more efficient than simply holding the case in
limbo by staying discovery and waiting for the plaintiff to attempt
to reverse engineer the defendant’s product.248
The Proposed Rule should help curb abusive litigation tactics by
patent trolls. Because of the heightened element-by-element plead-
ing requirements, defendants would have a meaningful opportunity
to dismiss frivolous claims before costly discovery begins.249 With
this increased likelihood of success at the pleading stage, defendants
would be less likely to immediately settle with patent trolls.250
Accordingly, the profitability of the patent troll business model
would decrease. Similarly, for patent trolls to survive a motion to
dismiss, and thus retain their strike suit power, they would need to
conduct thorough pre-suit investigations in order to make sufficient
allegations and infringement contentions. These thorough investi-
gations would increase the pre-suit costs for patent trolls, further
decreasing their profitability.251 The increased costs and higher
likelihood of failure “would make obtaining a nuisance-value
2010 WL 2991257, at *1, *4, *6 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (staying discovery because the
plaintiff was unable to create adequate infringement contentions, and ordering the plaintiff
to serve amended, and sufficient, infringement contentions by August 20, 2010, or the court
would dismiss the action).
247. Depending on the circumstances, this motion would likely need to be treated as a Rule
56 Summary Judgment Motion pursuant to Rule 12(d). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a). At this stage, the defendant would not be permitted to introduce additional
evidence to dispute any facts discovered by plaintiff. However, if the plaintiff’s charts fail to
show where each element of the asserted claims are practiced, construing the claims in the
broadest sense practicable, then the suit should be dismissed.
248. In the Northern District of California, when infringement contentions do not comply
with the local infringement contention rule, the district court will stay discovery and eventu-
ally, if the plaintiff is unable to create contentions that do comply, dismiss the suit. See, e.g.,
Bender, 2010 WL 2991257, at *1-2, *6.
249. See Moore, supra note 1, at 494-96; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
250. See Moore, supra note 1, at 495.
251. See id. at 494-95.
2017] PATENT INFRINGEMENT 343
settlement more difficult, thereby reducing the incentive to file a
nuisance-value action.”252
Outside the patent troll context, the Proposed Rule would balance
the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. The stricter pleading
requirements would give defendants a more potent tool for dis-
missing frivolous claims.253 And, when the pleadings are sufficient,
defendants would truly be on notice as to which claims and accused
instrumentalities are at issue.254 Similarly, sufficient infringement
contentions would define and guide the course of discovery from
early on in this case,255 resulting in efficiency that benefits both par-
ties. Finally, and importantly, the Proposed Rule, through the RIL
Exception, preserves the rights of meritorious plaintiffs who need
the benefit of some discovery to adequately allege infringement in
those unique circumstances in which the accused instrumentality
is used entirely behind closed doors.256 Ultimately, the Proposed
Rule strikes a reasonable balance of protecting defendants from
abusive plaintiffs, while protecting the rights of meritorious plain-
tiffs whose patents are infringed in private.
Andrew L. Milam*
252. Id. at 495.
253. Although defendants risk being subjected more easily to limited discovery in cases
where the RIL Exception is invoked than under the current local rules of the Northern
District of California or Eastern District of Texas, see supra Part II.B, this procedure still
protects defendants from frivolous lawsuits and might result in complete dismissal after the
limited discovery phase.
254. See Moore, supra note 1, at 495-96.
255. See Steinmetz, supra note 35, at 518 (describing how requiring plaintiffs to identify
particular infringing devices with “some measure of detail” will aid with the discovery
process).
256. Cf. Moore, supra note 1, at 502-03 (noting that proving infringement of some patents,
such as when “infringement occurs behind closed doors,” may be impossible without
discovery).
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